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On Product "Design Defects" and
Their Actionability
John W. Wade*
I. ANALYTic BACKGROUND
The history of the development of tort liability for physical in-
jury caused by products is perhaps the most striking and dramatic
of all the numerous evolutionary stories in the portfolio of tort sce-
narios.' It has been narrated on many occasions, 2 and to retell it
here would dissipate the effectiveness of an attempt to concentrate
on the most vexing and pressing problem of products liability that
the courts are struggling with today.
Some background is necessary, however, to set the stage. In
general today, a plaintiff who has suffered injury to his person or
his property from a product manufactured or supplied by the de-
fendant may sue in negligence, or for breach of an implied war-
ranty, or in strict tort liability. Many states recognize all three the-
ories and will permit a plaintiff to sue on all three at once; others
may not recognize all of the three or may impose limitations on the
ability to sue on all of them in the same action. Whichever theory
is used, the plaintiff must show that the product itself is actiona-
ble-that something is wrong with it that makes it dangerous. This
idea of "something wrong" is usually expressed by the adjective
"defective" and the plaintiff must show that the product was
defective.
As a term of art, "defective" gives little trouble when some-
thing goes wrong in the manufacturing process and the product is
not in its intended condition.' It is then defective in the normal
sense of the expression. The condition of a product, however, may
also be actionable if the product's design is not sufficiently safe or
if it does not have adequate instructions or warnings. In a case of
this type, the manufacturer intended the product to be in its pre-
sent condition, and to assert that it is defective or that it has a
*Distinguished Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Reporter, Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. B.A., 1932, J.D., 1934, University of Mississippi; LL.M., 1935, S.J.D., 1942,
Harvard University.
1. Like many of the stories, this one is almost entirely one of judicial change and
development.
2. The classic narration is that of Dean Prosser, who was Reporter for the Second Re-
statement when § 402A was adopted. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); PRossEa, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
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defective design is to use the term in a special sense that prevents
its being very helpful in determining, whether the product should
be found to be actionable. "Defective" thus becomes an
epithet-an expression for the legal conclusion rather than a test
for reaching that conclusion.
To reiterate: whether the suit is based on negligence, on
breach of implied warranty, or on strict liability, the product must
be found to be unsafe-dangerous by some measure-in order to be
actionable. At this point, I offer the suggestion that the measure of
lack of safety will turn out to be essentially the same for each of
the three theories, and that it is not in regard to this element that
a distinction is to be drawn between negligence and strict liability.
An example may be found in the landmark negligence case of
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,3 in which an automobile wheel
was "made of defective wood, and its spokes crumbled into frag-
ments."4 The plaintiff was injured when the wheel collapsed. Judge
Cardozo indicated that to be actionable a product must be "a thing
• . . reasonably certain to put life and limb in peril."5 Today we
would not make the standard so demanding; it would be sufficient
if the condition of the car created a significant risk to person or
property. If, on the other hand, the "defect" in Mr. MacPherson's
Buick was that the paint on the wheels was peeling off, with the
consequence that MacPherson was injured when a jack that he had
purchased separately collapsed while he was trying to take the
wheel off to repair it, the Buick Motor Company probably would
not be liable for the injury, even today.
In a suit based on implied warranty, the test is whether the
product was of merchantable quality or was suitable for the pur-
pose for which it was sold. If the suit is for a personal injury rather
than for loss of the bargain, the question is whether the product
was sufficiently safe for normal use or any particular use for which
it was sold. This issue can, of course, be put in terms of whether
the product was "defective." Strict tort liability grew out of the
concept of implied warranty, and the test for actionability of the
product is essentially the same-we have come to say that it de-
pends upon whether the product is "defective." ' "[I]n a products
liability action in which recovery is sought under the theory of neg-
3. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4. Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051.
5. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
6. "The reasons justifying strict liability emphasize that there must be something
wrong, if not in the manufacturer's manner of production, at least in his product." Traynor,
The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366
(1965).
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ligence, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a defect in the
product just as he does in an action where recovery is sought under
the strict liability theory or for breach of warranty."' The essential
difference between an action in negligence and one in strict liabil-
ity (or breach of warranty) lies not in the condition of the product
but in the requirement in the negligence action of additional proof
regarding the nature of the defendant's conduct. In the negligence
action, not only must the product itself be found actionable, but
the defendant must also be found negligent in letting the product
get into that dangerous condition, or in failing to discover the con-
dition and take reasonable action to eliminate it. In strict liability,
this is not required; all that the plaintiff must do is show that the
product was in the dangerous condition when it left the defendant's
control.'
In this connection, breach of implied warranty is to be classi-
fied with strict liability. In neither action need the plaintiff show
fault in the defendant's conduct in letting the chattel be in an un-
safe condition. Implied warranty has always been a strict liability
action. The same is also true in some instances of negligence per se
involving certain criminal statutes. An example is found in the
pure food statutes, which provide that foodstuffs must be whole-
some and not adulterated or contaminated. If the statute is con-
strued as being violated by a sale of unwholesome food, regardless
of whether the defendant was negligent in being responsible for its
condition, then to treat this condition as negligence per se is to
impose strict liability, regardless of the name that is given to it.?
The courts have long had the recognized authority to provide
as a rule of law that certain specific conduct constitutes negligence
(e.g., failure to stop at a railroad grade crossing), even in the ab-
sence of a criminal statute.'" Under this established authority, a
court may declare that putting a product on the market if it is not
duly safe is negligence per se-negligence as a matter of law. This
is essentially the strict liability of an implied warranty of
merchantability, and it should be so regarded despite the language
of negligence. Expressly recognizing this, several courts have ex-
plained their adoption of strict liability for products in terms of
7. Browder v. Pettigrew, 541 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tenn. 1976).
8. Id.
9. E.g., Donaldson v. Great A & P Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 213 (1938); McKenzie v.
Peoples Baking Co., 205 S.C. 149, 31 S.E.2d 154 (1944); Doherty v. S. S. Kresge Co., 227
Wis. 661, 278 N.W. 437 (1938).
10. "[T]he question of due care very generally'is left to the jury. But we are dealing
with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid down once for
all by the Courts." Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
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negligence per se.11 It would be a myopic mistake to accuse them of
persisting in using a straight negligence approach and failing to im-
pose strict liability.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING PRODUCT
ACTIONABiLITY
A. Historical Developments
In the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Products Co.,'"
Justice Traynor declared that a "manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being."' 3 A subsequent sentence in the
opinion declares that a plaintiff may recover if "he was injured
while using the [product] in a way it was intended to be used as a
result of a defect of design and [or?] manufacture of which plaintiff
was not aware that made the [product] unsafe for its intended
use."' 4 Here, then, are two different tests-"defective" in manufac-
ture or design, and "unsafe" for its intended use.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts had not
been officially promulgated at the time that Greenman was de-
cided, but Justice Traynor was a member of both the Reporter's
Advisory Committee and the Council of the American Law Insti-
tute when the proposed section was subjected to critical discussion;
moreover, the public distribution of the section as it appeared in
Tentative Draft No. 6"1 and discussion of it on the Institute floor
had taken place before he wrote his opinion in Greenman. Justice
Traynor was thus aware of the fact that, as originally. approved by
the Torts Advisers and submitted to the Council, section 402A re-
quired that the product be "in a condition dangerous to the con-
sumer," and that it had been changed by the Council to read "in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer or to his property." As the Reporter, Dean Prosser, ex-
plained on the Institute floor, the change was made to keep certain
types of products-whiskey, for example-from always being re-
garded as unreasonably dangerous in their normal condition. Thus,
the Advisers sought to ensure that it was understood that there
11. E.g., Cassell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976); Dippel v. Sciano, 37
Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
12. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
13. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
14. Id.
15. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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must be something wrong with the product.' 6 As defined in the
comments to section 402A, a "defective condition" is "a condition
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unrea-
sonably dangerous to him." 7 Thus, "defective condition" is the
description of the product, but "unreasonably dangerous" is the
test to be applied.
There was no indication that Justice Traynor contemplated
that Greenman was laying down a different standard from that be-
ing expressed in section 402A; when Dean Prosser prepared the
final draft of section 402A after Greenman was decided, he did not
regard it as offering a different approach or as suggesting a modifi-
cation of the language of the section or its comments. At any rate,
the combination of Greenman and section 402A provided the impe-
tus for converting evolutionary change into revolutionary change.
Jurisdiction after jurisdiction abruptly changed over from dubious
devices for supplying the required privity in implied warranty cases
to a frank recognition of strict tort liability for products, in which
privity need not be proved. Greenman and section 402A were uni-
formly cited as the authoritative legal bases of the new doctrine.
The major point of discussion quickly switched from the ques-
tion whether strict products liability should be adopted to a consid-
eration of the details of the doctrine. Cases and commentators fo-
cused on the standards to be applied and on how far the doctrine
should expand. There was considerable treatment of the nature of
the legal theory behind strict liability and of the most useful tests
for determining when the action could be maintained. Strict prod-
uct liability had developed out of liability for breach of an implied
warranty for merchantability. This carried with it a background of
loss of a bargain, of failing to receive what one had contracted for.
This in turn raised connotations of the expectations of the pur-
chaser of the product in regard to the product's safety. Some com-
mentators asserted'" and cases agreed" that the most appropriate
test for determining whether a product was actionable turned on
the reasonable expectations of the consumer.
16. This is treated in more detail in Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 49 Miss. L.J. 825, 830 (1973).
17. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToaTs § 402A, Comment g (1965).
18. E.g., Dickerson, Product Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND.
L.J. 301 (1967); Rheingold, What are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations?," 22 Bus.
LAW. 589 (1967). See also REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment i (1965) ("The
article must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the commu-
nity as to its characteristics.")
19. E.g., Vinor v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326,
230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
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Other commentators thought it more appropriate for the test
to be derived from the law of torts rather than of contracts, and
suggested that the issue should depend on whether a reasonable
supplier would put the product on the market, assuming that he
knew of its actual dangerous condition." It was the supplying of
scienter-the knowledge of the dangerous condition-that differen-
tiated strict liability from negligence; the plaintiff was under no
obligation to show that the defendant negligently caused the prod-
uct to be in the dangerous condition or that he was negligent in
failing to discover it and do something about it. This approach,
too, was adopted in several cases.2 The suggestion was then made
that the test might be two-fold, so that a plaintiff could prevail by
showing either that the product did not meet the reasonable expec-
tations of the ordinary consumer or that a reasonable supplier
would not put it on the market if he knew of its actual condition.
This suggestion also acquired its adherents. 22
The common law of torts was developing according to its ac-
customed wont. It was reaching a consensus on the concept that
the product must be unreasonably dangerous to be actionable, and
it was working out a usable and meaningful test to submit to the
jury for determining whether a particular product was unreasona-
bly dangerous. Then, in 1972, the Supreme Court of California ren-
dered its decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.23 The court reex-
amined its opinion in Greenman and decided that the standard
articulated in that case differed from the Restatement standard in
that the former required only that the product be defective, not
that it be unreasonably dangerous. The latter concept, the court
declared, "rings of negligence,"2 and it had adopted strict liability,
which it said was not based on the unreasonableness idea in negli-
gence or on a form of culpability. All that the plaintiff need do was
to show that the product was "defective." The Cronin decision was
soon followed by the Alaska Supreme Court"5 and by an intermedi-
20. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRAcusE L. REv. 559 (1969); Keeton, Product Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufactur-
ers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Wade, supra note 16.
21. E.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978); Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
22. E.g., Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973); Henderson v.
Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory
and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. Rzv. 803
(1976).
23. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
24. Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
25. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
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ate court in New Jersey. 26
Cronin was vigorously attacked in several articles.Y "Defec-
tive" might possibly have useful meaning in a case involving a mis-
carriage in the manufacturing process, the writers suggested, but it
gave no real guidance in a case involving a design claimed to be
insufficiently safe or a failure to provide an adequate warning.
Without explanation of some nature in the instructions, a jury
would be utterly at sea and deliberately left to decide according to
its own unguided whim or caprice.
The criticism told, and Cronin was not followed elsewhere. A
number of courts gave thorough and careful consideration to the
problem and determined to retain the Restatement's unreasonably-
dangerous approach 2 -usually with some basis for translating it to
the jury in terms of reasonable expectations or reasonableness in
putting the product on the market in that condition, or a combina-
tion of the two. Courts referred frequently to factors to be taken
into consideration-at least by the court-in deciding whether the
unreasonably dangerous issue was appropriate to submit to the
jury in the particular case. The Cronin episode thus turned out to
be a mere side eddy in the orderly flow of the common law system
toward an established and settled conclusion.
B. Current Developments
In the last two years, however, the orderly flow of development
has turned into a swampy quagmire and threatens to split into sev-
eral different streams with diverse destinations. A number of ap-
pellate judges, aware that they are engaged in the conscious task of
molding the law of strict products liability, have become concerned
that they are not differentiating with sufficient clarity between
strict liability and negligence, especially in design cases. In re-
sponse, they have sought to devise a significant and well-articu-
lated distinction. At the same time, other judges, who have become
concerned that the differentiation is becoming too great, have at-
tempted to devise means of keeping the broadening scope of strict
liability in check. The result has been several cases in which the
standard for strict liability in the design area has been very care-
26. Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 309 A.2d 562 (1973).
27. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973);
Wade, supra note 16.
28. E.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co.,
269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542
P.2d 774 (1975).
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fully examined by the court and often vigorously debated by the
judges themselves. There is, at present, much uncertainty as to the
outcome of the turmoil, and an examination of the important re-
cent cases and analysis of their significance may be useful.
As is so often true in the torts field, the present analysis begins
with a California case. In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 29 involv-
ing an alleged "design defect" in a high-lift loader, the California
Supreme Court held that the trial court erred when it instructed
the jury that the loader must be unreasonably dangerous, because
such instructions had been ruled out by Cronin. The court recog-
nized indirectly, however, that the Cronin rule-simply using the
word "defective"-was inadequate. In its place, the Barker court
proposed a "two-pronged definition of design defect." Under this
definition, a "design defect" is held to exist
(1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the
product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails
to prove, in light of the relevant factors ... that on balance the bene-
fits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design. 0
A careful reading of the opinion indicates that the Barker rule
has substantially modified the court's position in Cronin. At this
point, then, the essential difference between the present California
rule and the "unreasonably dangerous" language of the Second Re-
statement is one primarily of semantics, except that the burden of
proof has been shifted from plaintiff to defendant. The Barker
court was careful to phrase the test not in terms of defendant's con-
duct, but in terms of the actionability of the product itself. In bal-
ancing the benefits of the particular design against the risk of dan-
ger inherent in it, the court employs a cost-benefit analysis to
determine if the product is unreasonably dangerous, whether that
language is used or not. As it did with Cronin, the Supreme Court
of Alaska followed Barker in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck.3
Barker and Caterpillar should be compared with the recent de-
cision of the Texas Supreme Court in Turner v. General Motors
Corp.3" This case involved the question of "defective design" in a
car roof that caved in when the car rolled over. Texas earlier had
adopted the Restatement approach that to be actionable the prod-
uct must be unreasonably dangerous; this was explained to the jury
29. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
30. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
31. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
32. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
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by the "bifurcated test" of whether it would (1) meet the reason-
able expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety, or (2) be
placed on the market by a prudent manufacturer who was aware of
the danger involved in its alleged defect. The intermediate court
had reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, substituting for the
bifurcated test a list of four factors to be balanced by the jury.13
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and restored the jury verdict
for plaintiff. The opinion held first, that the issue to be posed for
the jury was whether the product was "defectively designed," and
second, that this term means "a product that is unreasonably dan-
gerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the
product and the risk involved in its use. 34 It agreed that the bifur-
cated test should be eliminated as an instruction to the jury, on the
ground of the "inclusiveness of the idea that jurors would know
what ordinary consumers would expect in the consumption and use
of a product, or that jurors would or could apply any standard or
test outside of their own experiences and expectations. '3 As for the
balancing factors, the court found that "evidence necessary to ad-
dress the appropriate elements . . . should be overtly advanced by
both parties . . . ; but this does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that the jury should be specifically instructed concerning these
considerations." 36
The Supreme Court of Oregon expressly declined to follow the
California Barker ruling in the case of Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp. 7 In comprehensive opinions in two previous cases, 38 it had
held that to be actionable a product must be "dangerously defec-
tive," and that the test for this is whether "a reasonable person
would . . . put [it] into the stream of commerce if he had knowl-
edge of its harmful character;"31 the court also quoted a list of fac-
tors to be used by the court in determining whether a case had
been sufficient to submit to the jury. The Wilson case involved the
crash of a Piper Cherokee light airplane. At issue was the design of
the aircraft, specifically the use of a carburetor rather than a fuel
injector to get the fuel-air mixture to the combustion chambers.
33. General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
34 Id. at 847 n.1.
35. 584 S.W.2d at 851.
36. Id. at 849.
37. 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, rehearing denied with opinion, 282 Or. 411, 569 P.2d
1287 (1978).
38. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Roach v. Ko-
nonen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
39. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 594, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974) (em-
phasis in original).
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There was evidence that a carburetor is subject to icing, which
causes engine failure, while an engine with a fuel injection system
is immune from this risk. Plaintiffs also demonstrated that carbu-
retor icing was a probable cause of the plane crash. On the other
hand, the evidence showed that eighty to ninety percent of compa-
rable airplanes have carbureted rather than fuel injected engines,
although no explanation was given of why this was the case. There
was no evidence of what effect the substitution of a'fuel injection
design would have had upon "the airplane's cost, economy of oper-
ation, maintenance requirement, over-all performance, or safety in
respects other than susceptibility to icing."4 The court held that
whether the use of a carburetor constituted a dangerous defect was
not an issue to be submitted to the jury for it to determine "solely
on the basis of inference and common knowledge."'" The trial court
must "be satisfied that there is evidence from which the jury could
find the suggested alternatives are not only technically feasible but
also practicable in terms of cost and the over-all danger and opera-
tion of the product."42 In the absence of this evidence this issue
should not have been submitted to the jury.43
The Pennsylvania case of Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.4" is
confusing and of uncertain significance. In Azzarello, the plaintiff
suffered injury to her right hand when it was caught between two
hard rubber rolls in a coating machine used in her employment.
Plaintiff brought action against the manufacturer who impleaded
plaintiff's employer. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the
manufacturer and against the employer. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania quoted and relied upon Cronin, declaring
that "the words 'unreasonably dangerous' have no independent sig-
nificance and merely represent a label to be used where it is deter-
mined that the risk of loss should be placed upon the supplier.""
In the view of the court, the words should, therefore, not be used in
an instruction to the jury; to put them in an instruction was thus
held to be reversible error.40 The opinion then addressed the rela-
tive functions of judge and jury, stating that the "lay jury. . . [is]
competent in resolving a dispute as to the condition of a product";
it is the court, however, that makes the decision as to wlkether
that condition justifies placing liability upon the supplier:
40. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. at 70, 577 P.2d at 1328.
41. Id. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1327.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
45. Id. at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025.
46. Id.
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Should an ill-conceived design which exposes the user to a risk of harm
entitle one injured by the product to recover? . . . When does the util-
ity of a product outweigh the unavoidable danger it may pose? These
are questions of law and their resolution depends upon social pol-
icy. . . . It is a judicial function to decide whether, under plaintiffs
averment of the facts, recovery would be justified; and only after this
judicial determination is made is the cause submitted to the jury to
determine whether the facts of the case support the averments of the
complaint.47
These cryptic remarks are extremely difficult to interpret. The
court may be saying that the jury merely determines the facts and
that the judge determines whether the product is actionable on
those facts. But the judge's decision is on the "plaintiff's averment
of the facts.""8 Is this treated like a demurrer or motion to dismiss?
Is this like strict liability of the type of Rylands v. Fletcher,"' under
which the judge decides as a matter of law whether an activity is
abnormally dangerous and instructs the jury that strict liability is
imposed or negligence is required? Or is it the rule that since the
law imposes strict liability on products in general, the decision is
already made for the judge? From the opinion, one cannot be sure.
This may not be a matter of consequence, because the Az-
zarello court proceeded immediately to the determination of "when
liability should attach in cases where a 'bad design' is charged." 50
The court quoted from two earlier cases, one to the effect that "a
manufacturer . .. is' effectively the guarantor of his products'
safety . . . [and] impliedly represents that it is safe for its in-
tended use;"51 and the other that a "seller must provide with the
product every element necessary to make it safe for use. '5 2 To these
remarks it adds:
For the term guarantor to have any meaning in this context the
supplier must at least provide a product which is designed to make it
safe for the intended use. Under this standard ... the jury may find a
defect where the product left the supplier's control lacking any element
necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature
that renders it unsafe for the intended use.Y
47. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
48. Id.
49. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
50. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
51. Id. (quoting Salvador v. Atlantic Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907
(1974)).
52. Id. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027 (quoting Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462
Pa. 83, 100, 337 A.2d 893, 902 (1975)).
53. Id. A footnote to this statement approves as an "adequate charge to the jury" the
following:
The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The product must, therefore,
be provided with every element necessary to make it safe for [its intended] use. If you
find that the product, at the time it left the defendant's control, lacked any element
1980]
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In New Jersey, the case of Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering
Co. 4 had thoroughly treated the subject of design defects and
had come to be recognized as a leading case espousing the consen-
sus view described in Section II B of this Article. It was overruled
fifteen months later in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry Machine Co."
The new opinion, relying on the California Cronin case, repudiated
the incorporation "of the 'defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous' language in the jury charge [because it] appears to impose a
greater burden on plaintiff than is warranted.""5 Instead, the court
held that the trial court
should charge generally that a manufacturer has an obligation to dis-
tribute products which are reasonably fit, suitable and safe for their in-
tended or foreseeable purposes .... In those design defect situations
in which the defect is not self-evident, the trial court should also charge
the jury on whether the manufacturer, it being deemed to have known
of the harmful propensity of the product, acted as a reasonable prudent
one. Depending on the proofs, the trial court should explain pertinent
factors related to the determination of reasonable prudence. 5
In this simplified exposition of the standard for determining design
defect, there are overtones of warranty ("fit and suitable") and
negligence ("reasonabl[y] prudent") that are emphasized at greater
length in the opinion. Simplified a little more, however, they may
turn out to be not substantially different from the standard in
Cepeda.
Some language on the relative functions of the judge and jury
may also be not entirely clear. At one point, the court provides a
brief list of factors that may be considered by the jury in decid-
ing the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct [including] the
technological feasibility of manufacturing a product whose design would
have prevented or avoided the accident, given the known state of the art;
and the likelihood that the product will cause injury and the probable
seriousness of the injury.58
The court also says, however, that "it is the function of the court to
decide whether the manufacturer has the duty and obligation im-
necessary to make it safe for [its intended] use, then the product was defective, and the
defendant is liable for all harm caused by such defect.
Pa. Standard Jury Instr. 8.02 (Civil), Subcomm. Draft (June 6, 1976).
54. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
55. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
56. 406 A.2d at 152.
57. Id. at 153. The court also speaks twice of an "improper design" as amounting to a
defect.
58. Id. at 152. The court noted that "[s]tate of the art refers not only to the common
practice and standards of the industry but also to other design alternatives within practical
and technological limits at the time of distribution." Id.
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posed by the strict liability principle. 52 The court adds that: "The
trial court must determine whether the duty of strict liability ex-
ists. In doing so, it should weigh all pertinent risk/utility factors.""0
What standard should the trial judge use when determining when
to let the case go to the jury?
In Fischer v. Cleveland Punch and Shear Works Co.,"1 the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin rendered a decision that solidified an in-
cipient aberration in the Wisconsin law of products liability. The
suit was against the manufacturer of a punch press that injured the
plaintiff, allegedly because of defects in the design of the safety
system. The unit had two circuit switches and a foot-control
switch; the press could become activated even when the obvious
stop switch was punched, if the operator stepped on the foot
switch. The plaintiffs arm was injured when he inadvertently oper-
ated the press in this manner. The court held that the trial court
correctly permitted the plaintiff to sue both in strict liability on the
Restatement basis of a product "in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous" and also on a basis of ordinary negligence. The
jury found the press free of design defects that would render it un-
reasonably dangerous, but found that the defendants were negli-
gent in the design of the product. Rejecting defendants' contention
that the verdict was inconsistent, the court quoted from an earlier
case:
Where a plaintiff proves negligence-in this case, the lack of ordi-
nary care in the design of a product-there is no doubt that there may
be recovery in the event the defective design results in an unreasonably
dangerous product, but there may be recovery for the negligent design
of a product even though it is not unreasonably dangerous in the 402A
sense. All that is necessary to prove is that the product is designed with
a lack of ordinary care and that lack of care resulted in injury.
59. Id. at 151.
60. Id. at 153.
61. 91 Wis. 2d 85, 280 N.W.2d 280 (1979).
62. Id. at 98, 280 N.W.2d at 286 (quoting Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 603-04,
235 N.W.2d 677, 685 (1975) (Heffernan, J., concurring). The Greiten case is a strange one.
The purported majority opinion (Robert W. Housen, J.), carefully spells out the develop-
ment of Wisconsin's negligence per se theory of products liability in Dippel v. Sciano, 37
Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), and quotes Vinor v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum
Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 330, 230 N.W.2d 794, 797 (1975): "However, even under
negligence law, the plaintiff still must prove that the product causing the injury was danger-
ous and defective." Greiten holds: "Thus if the plaintiff [in the negligence action] did not
establish that the alleged defect in design was 'unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer' he cannot recover." 70 Wis. 2d at 595, 235 N.W.2d at 682. A directed verdict for the
defendant was therefore affirmed. In a concurring opinion which referred to the Housen opin-
ion as the majority opinion, Heffernan, J., agreed with the affirmance of the trial court but
said, "While I completely agree with the majority opinion that the proof was insufficient, I
am satisfied that the threshold question is not whether the product was unreasonably dan-
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It would appear that both the jury and the supreme court
acted under a misconception regarding the meaning of the phrase,
"in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous," as used in sec-
tion 402A. Very likely, the jury's misapprehension was of the words
"defective condition." They must have thought that "defective"
meant that the product must turn out to be in a different condition
from what the manufacturer intended; that is, it must have been
"mismanufactured." Of course, the design may also be "bad" or
"improper" or "defective." The court's misapprehension, on the
other hand, must have dealt with the words "unreasonably danger-
ous." If a "product is designed with- a lack of care and that lack of
care resulted in injury," it must have been because the product
was dangerous-unsafe-in some measure. Other courts and com-
mentators have not required a higher measure of dangerousness for
strict liability than for negligence. None was intended by the draft-
ers of the Restatement, especially in design cases. Unnecessary
confusion is created by trying to draw a distinction. The confusion,
however, may not often produce a different result. In the Fischer
case, for example, if there had been a single action based on strict
liability and the jury had had a proper understanding of "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous," it almost certainly would have
found that the press was unreasonably dangerous.
A final major case goes in the opposite direction from that
taken by most of those discussed. In Owens v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp.,"3 the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed a directed verdict
for the defendant in a case in which a forklift overturned, crushing
the driver's skull. Declaring that "triers of fact are not formulators
of public policy and . . . trial courts are inappropriate for the task
in the area of product design choices," 4 the court took the position
that adjudication must necessarily play a limited role in setting
design standards and that these standards should be "extrajudi-
cially established." 5 It therefore concluded that
gerous but whether the defendant exercised ordinary care and whether that lack of ordinary
care was the legal cause of the injuries." 70 Wis. 2d at 604, 235 N.W.2d at 686. That opinion
was joined by three other justices and was declared in a later case to be the majority opin-
ion. See Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976). It can be argued that
the position taken in both Greiten and Howes was not necessary to the final holding and was
therefore dictum, but it was followed by the federal court in Schuldies v. Service Machine
Co., 448 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Wis. 1978), a case almost identical factually with Fischer, the
principal case, which therefore fully establishes the Wisconsin position unless it is given a
complete reexamination by the court.
63. 83 Mich. App. 74, 286 N.W.2d 291 (1978).
64. Id. at 80, 286 N.W.2d at 294.
65. Id.
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to establish a question of fact as to a manufacturer's breach of duty in
design defect products liability litigation, evidence of the following
must be presented: (1) that the particular design was not in conformity
with industry design standards, design guidelines established by an au-
thoritative voluntary association, or design criteria set by legislative or
other governmental regulations, or (2) that the design choice of the
manufacturer carries with it a latent risk of injury and the manufac-
turer has not adequately communicated the nature of that risk to po-
tential users of the product."
This holding, then, is directed at the "inappropriateness not only
of the jury but of the trial judge as well, at the litigation process as
a whole."67
Brief reference should be made to a few decisions construing
some of the major cases discussed above and therefore supplement-
ing them. There are several California appeals cases construing
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.6" Perhaps the most important is
Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc.,69 holding that despite the
elimination of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" in a design
case, it is appropriate in a warning case to instruct the jury that
they must find that the "absence of an adequate warning renders
the article substantially dangerous to the user." The appellate
panel noted that "[b]y using the modifying adverb 'substantially,'
the [trial] court appropriately indicated that a weighing of degrees
of danger was necessarily involved in determining the existence of a
defect." 0
The cases of Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co.7' and Korli v. Ford
Motor Co.7" treat the need of the plaintiffs to establish a prima fa-
cie case in order to reach the jury. There remains some uncertainty
on this issue. The California Supreme Court directed that the court
of appeals opinion in Korli was not to be published, but it refused
to grant a hearing on the case or set aside the intermediate court's
direction to the trial judge to enter judgment for the defendant. 3
66. Id. at 81, 286 N.W.2d at 294-95.
67. The opinion is strongly influenced by articles of Professor James A. Henderson. See
generally Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. Ray. 1531 (1973); Henderson, Design Defect Litigation
Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. J. 541 (1976).
68. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 29-30 supra.
69. 95 Cal. App. 3d 341, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979).
70. Id. at 349, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
71. 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978).
72. PROD. Lure. REP. (CCH) 8340 (Cal. App. 1978) (originally published in advance
sheets in 84 Cal. App. 3d 895, 149 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978), but withdrawn by order of the
California Supreme Court).
73. There was also language in the opinion deprecating the capability of "lay juries to
simply make value judgments as to the relative desirability of one design over another," and
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The court in Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.74 held that some in-
struction defining defective condition must be given to the jury.
The Alaska court's decision in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck,75 adopting the Barker rule after a thorough discussion was
followed by the case of Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales,
Inc.,7 which held that in balancing the risk of harm against the
utility of the product design, "scientific knowability" refers to
knowledge as of the time that the product is marketed and that
this does not "reintroduce elements of negligence concepts into the
determination of defectiveness .'77
It is interesting to note that while all of these decisions have
the apparent effect of gently nudging Barker back toward a some-
what more central position, an intermediate court in Texas has
gone further than the Texas Supreme Court did in Turner v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.75 In Bailey v. Boatland of Houston,79 the court
held that not only. would the custom of the trade in not installing a
"kill switch" on an outboard motor so that it would stop if the
operator fell overboard not be controlling, but also that evidence
could not be introduced in the trial that a switch of this nature was
unavailable and could not be obtained for incorporation into the
motor as a safety device. That holding seems more in accord with
the concurring opinion in Turner than with the majority opinion."
II. WHAT SHOULD THE STANDARD BE?
A. The Section 402A Standard and its Alternatives
How should one evaluate these contemporary decisions and
what developments do they portend for the future? Further, what
should be the test, if one seeks objectively to find a fair balance
between the conflicting interests of the manufacturer (or other sup-
plier) and the consumer (or other injured party)? An initial conclu-
sion is that many courts are now inclined to insist more rigidly that
the test for an improper design be expressed solely in terms of the
condition of the product. Putting the test in terms of the reasona-
ble expectations of one group of people (buyers) or in terms of the
this may well have been the source of the Supreme Court's disapproval. 84 Cal. App. 3d at
906, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
74. 91 Cal. App. 3d 372, 154 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978).
75. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
76. PROD. LtAR. REP. (CCH) 8521 (Alaska 1979).
77. Id. at p. 18,524.
78. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
79. 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
80. 584 S.W.2d 844, 854 (Tex. 1979) (Campbell, J., concurring).
[Vol. 33:551
DESIGN DEFECTS
reasonable conduct of another group of people (manufacturers or
suppliers) is regarded by these courts in both instances as a diver-
sion, which leads the decision-maker's thoughts away from the cen-
tral issue. Moreover, the first test smacks too closely of breach of
warranty and loss of the bargain, with all its contractual restric-
tions and nontortious approach. The second looks too much like
negligence, and while this test sounds in tort it may give the im-
pression that the defendant's conduct must be shown to be culpa-
ble or blameworthy.
Notwithstanding these reservations, the second approach may
indeed have some utility. It should be stressed that this suggestion
is not intended to change strict liability into negligence liability;
this test expressly provides that the determination of whether a
reasonable prudent manufacturer would put the product on the
market must be made with the assumption that the manufacturer
knew of the dangerous condition of the product. There is no need to
prove negligence in letting the product become dangerous or in fail-
ing to discover or do something about the dangerous condition. It
should be clear that this approach to products liability would be
most useful in the mismanufacture case, rather than in the case in
which the design was defective. The thought was that by seeing the
issue in a familiar form-a form that would clearly show the differ-
ence between negligence and strict liability-the jury might better
understand the task before it. Of course, since posing the issue in
this form does not change the substantive law to be applied, any
court that doubts the effect of this approach on the jury should feel
free to adopt another.
We come then to the test to be used in determining whether
the product itself is actionable. Some recent cases have gone to ex-
tremes in both directions on this matter. Several cases, for example,
have taken the position that a product is actionable unless it meets
a standard of safety that is much higher in strict liability cases
than in a negligence action. Thus, while the Pennsylvania court in
Azzarello denied that it was imposing an insurer's liability, the
supplier has been cast "in the role of a guarantor of his product's
safety." 8' Moreover, the Pennsylvania cases hold that the product
is defective if it is "lacking any element necessary to make it safe
for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe
for the intended use."82 Justice Campbell's concurring opinion in
81. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 553, 391 A.2d 1020, 1024 (1979). What is
the distinction between an insurer and a guarantor?
82. Id. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027. See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
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Turner v. General Motors Corp.s3 took a similar tack. Decrying the
majority's use of the unreasonably dangerous standard, he asserted
that strict liability must require "the maximum possible protection
for the user of the product." 84
How, one may ask, could any automobile today turn out not to
be actionable under these tests? In a collision an automobile may
possibly catch fire-no matter where the gas tank is located or how
it is protected. Should we require every car to have an automatic
sprinkling system, regardless of how that might affect its gasoline
mileage? A governor limiting the speed to ten miles per hour would
make it much safer-but probably not safe enough. Clearly, safety
must be a relative matter, and a balancing process of some sort is
necessary to determine whether a product is sufficiently safe-
regardless of whether the suit is in negligence or in strict liability.
At the opposite extreme, some take the position that the
courts are not expert in the complex technological aspects of so-
phisticated machines and therefore are not adequately qualified to
pass judgment on the safety of the product. Instead, the determi-
nation should be left to the persons who are fully expert-the man-
ufacturers themselves. So long as the design is in accordance with
design standards of the industry, the manufacturer's determina-
tions should be controlling. These design standards depend on cus-
toms in the trade, guidelines of voluntary associations, and regula-
tions by legislatures and administrative agencies. This position has
been strongly urged in law reviews8" and has been adopted in at
least one case."8
Whatever its theoretical merits, this position is unrealistic.
Tort law presently permits only physicians to establish by their
customs and practices standards for liability that will normally be
treated as binding on court and jury. 7 There is little likelihood that
83. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
84. Id. at 853. Construed literally, this would apparently mean that all products of a
particular kind would have to be made exactly alike. There is only one maximum possible
protection. Cf. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach., 48 U.S.L.W. 2578 (N.Y.,
Feb. 14, 1980) ("manufacturer's duty does not extend to designing a product that is impossi-
ble to abuse or whose safety features may not be circumvented").
85. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Henderson, Renewed Judicial Con-
troversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consen-
sus, 63 MINN. L. Ray. 773 (1979); cf. Epstein, Product Liability: The Search for the Middle
Ground, 56 N.C. L. REV. 643 (1978).
86. Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 286 N.W.2d 291 (1978).
87. Even here, if the customary practice is sufficiently dubious, the courts may decide
as a matter of law, or let the jury decide, that the practice is actionable. See, e.g., Helling v.
Carey, 84 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
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this approach will be extended from doctors to manufacturers.
Theoretically, the medical profession determines its professional
customs without regard to profit. Manufacturers, on the other
hand, are frankly in the business of making and selling products for
the profit involved, and their determination of the need for expen-
sive safety features may be strongly influenced by their estimates
of the effect these features will have on their incomes. This is espe-
cially likely if they understand that their decisions will not be sub-
ject to reevaluation by the courts in imposing liability. Of course,
customs are admissible in evidence and they should carry substan-
tial weight;88 they should not, however, be controlling. As for ad-
ministrative regulations, they are usually minimum standards.
Thus, while a violation is and should be actionable, compliance
should not insulate a manufacturer from liability. To make these
regulations controlling as to reasonable safety would not even be in
the interests of the manufacturers themselves. Administrative
agencies, realizing that compliance with the regulations would
mean that there could be no recovery, would inevitably set those
standards higher than they are now and compliance would be
much more difficult.
Of course, one might be able to devise a test for improper de-
sign in a strict liability action that would be more favorable either
to the plaintiff or the defendant in a negligence action without go-
ing to the extremes described above.8" The courts and the writers
have not attempted to do this, however. The resulting distinction
would have to be technical and confusing, and would not accom-
plish a very useful purpose. The real distinction is already clear
enough. Although the actionable condition of the product may be
the same for both actions, in negligence the plaintiff must also
prove negligent conduct in creating that condition or failing to dis-
cover and correct it; in strict liability this is not required. 0
88. But cf. Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), hold-
ing that common practices and the unavailability of a particular safety device are not even
admissible in evidence, under the new rule in Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d
844 (Tex. 1979). There is some doubt that this is a correct interpretation of the Turner case.
See also Hancock v. Peccar, Inc., PROD. L.B. RE. (CCH) 8589 (Neb. 1979)(evidence of
state of the art may be considered by the jury but is not controlling).
89. There may, however, be a difference in the burden of proof. See text accompanying
notes 109-17 infra. A distinction might also be drawn on the issue of whether a warning is
sufficient or the danger must be eliminated; or whether the open and obvious nature of the
danger is sufficient; but the standard in the negligence action is likely to be as high as in the
strict liability action.
90. In many of the design cases, of course, the mere fact that the product has an un-
reasonably dangerous design is enough to give rise to the reasonable inference that the man-
ufacturer was negligent in putting it out in that condition.
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How, then, should a test for determining when a design is so
improper that liability should be imposed be articulated? The Re-
statement uses the expression "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous." While "defective condition" may be meaningful when
something goes wrong in the manufacturing process and the prod-
uct is not in its intended condition, this phrase has no real signifi-
cance in an improper design case and is likely to prove misleading.
The significant words when design is at issue are "unreasona-
bly dangerous." The phrase has been widely adopted, and it has
the effect of pointing out to the trier of fact, whether judge or jury,
the nature of the decision that is required. This formulation has
been criticized because it too closely resembles negligence in indi-
cating a balancing process." This criticism is not well taken, since
as demonstrated above, a coherent analysis in design defect cases
requires a balancing process. An absolute test for liability is not
feasible unless one seeks to impose an insurer's liability. Few have
seriously urged such a sweeping proposal, and even if it were
adopted by a court it would be subject to prompt change by the
legislature. Moreover, to apply a balancing test in determining the
actionability of the defendant's product is not necessarily to apply
such a test to his conduct, as in a negligence action.
Another criticism sometimes directed at the phrase is that
"unreasonably dangerous" has no meaning for the jury but serves
merely as an epithet to be applied to the product after the decision
has been made . 2 This criticism could fairly be directed at the
phrase "defective condition" in an improper design case, but it is
completely unjustified when applied to "unreasonably dangerous."
The latter phrase serves as a succinct description of the test the
jury is to apply. 3 Still another criticism takes a different tack. It
asserts that the two words may erroneously lead the jury to believe
that the plaintiff must prove that the product was unusually, ex-
tremely, or abnormally dangerous, or even extrahazardous.14 If the
jury receives this impression, it is wrong and unfair to the plaintiff.
If the instruction is properly phrased, however, it seems unlikely
that this erroneous impression would be created. The possibility
that this might happen, however, seems greater when one considers
that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has apparently made a simi-
91. See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
92. Azzarello v. Black Bros., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 559, 391 A.2d 1020, 1025 (1978).
93. This is not to say that a more detailed instruction is inappropriate.
94. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 425, 572 P.2d 443, 451, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 233 (1978); Fischer v. Cleveland Punch & Shear Works, 91 Wis. 2d 85, 98, 280
N.W.2d 280, 286 (1979).
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lar mistake as to the meaning of the expression."
It was considerations such as these which prompted my propo-
sal elsewhere that courts substitute the phrase "not reasonably
safe."" This expression-and to a slightly lesser degree, its con-
verse, "unreasonably unsafe"' 7-articulates the duty of the manu-
facturer to put out a reasonably safe product. The exact words used
are not truly vital, however,9" and a court should be free to choose
among these and other expressions that aptly indicate the balanc-
ing process involved in applying the standard."
B. Further Refinements
1. Additional Explanation in the Charge
Some courts are concerned that the phrase "unreasonably dan-
gerous," without more, does not put the issue meaningfully before
the jury, and that the balancing process should be spelled out in
more detail. The two leading cases, Turner v. General Motors
Corp. ' and Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 10' attempt to do this
by using the expression "defectively designed," but they appear to
go in different directions. Turner, as originally issued, defined this
phrase to mean "a design that is unreasonably dangerous;" 10" the
revised opinion substituted for this explanation the following: "a
product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into
consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its
use." 103 Barker, on the other hand, declines to use "unreasonably
95. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
96. See Wade, supra note 20, at 15. Adopting this phrase are Morrow v. Caloric Appli-
ance Co., 372 S.W.2d 41, 55 (Mo. 1963), Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d
145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975), and Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d
66 (W. Va. 1979). In a later article I suggested that a better phrase might be "not duly safe."
Wade, supra note 16, at 833. The thought behind this was that the adjective "duly" more
adequately carried the connotation of a deliberate balancing process. Further thought has
brought me back to the initial suggestion. I am now inclined to doubt whether the lay jury
would derive that connotation from the word "duly."
97. This is the expression used in the Department of Commerce's UNIFORM PRODUCT
LiABInrry ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). See particularly § 104 and Comment,
44 Fed. Reg. 62,621-26.
98. Thus, the Washington Court of Appeals very appropriately held in Kimble v.
Waste Sys. Int'l, Inc., 23 Wash. App. 331, 595 P.2d 569 (1979) that, although the state supreme
court had previously approved the expression "not reasonably safe," it was not reversible
error for a trial court to use instead "unreasonably dangerous."
99. Some other expressions used or suggested-unduly dangerous, defectively danger-
ous, improperly dangerous, dangerously defective.
100. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
101. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). See note 29 supra and
accompanying text.
102. PROD. LLB. REP. (CCH) 8400, at 17,982 n. 1.
103. 584 S.W.2d at 847, n.1.
19801
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
dangerous" or any other similar expression and spells out a " 'risk-
benefit' standard": liability depends on whether, "in light of the
relevant factors . . .on balance the benefits of the challenged de-
sign outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design."'' 4
The Turner court is right to use a phrase such as "unreasona-
bly dangerous" or "not reasonably safe." It poses the nature of the
issue for the jury in a succinct and understandable fashion and
puts the rest of the instruction in proper context. The explanation
of the balancing process is similar in the two cases. Both refer to
the risk created by the design, while there is little difference be-
tween a design's "benefit" and its "utility." Neither gives an illu-
sion of certainty by purporting to apply the standard mechanical-
ly-by filling in figures and using a calculator. Of the two,
however, the California court's language is more likely to make
clear to the jury that it is to look primarily to the utility or benefit
of that aspect of the design which is claimed to be improper or
"defective" rather than to the utility or benefit of the product in
general.
2. Use of Factors
Courts and commentators frequently have prepared and com-
piled lists of factors to be taken into consideration in determining
whether a particular product is actionable. These factors are some-
times set forth in instructions to the jury. In the Turner case, the
intermediate court had prepared a list of four comprehensive fac-
tors that it held should be enumerated for the jury."0 5 The Texas
Supreme Court, however, held that while evidence regarding them
was admissible, the jury should not be instructed to balance specif-
ically enumerated factors. ' In Barker, on the other hand, the Cali-
fornia court declared that a jury may consider "the gravity of the
danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such
danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alterna-
tive design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the ad-
verse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would
result from an alternative design."10 There is merit in both posi-
tions. Courts rightly have hesitated to provide juries with a list of
policy factors to be balanced in reaching a value judgment. In a
design case, on the other hand, it seems appropriate to instruct the
104. 20 Cal. 3d at 427, 573 P.2d at 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
105. 584 S.W.2d at 846 (quoting Turner v. General Motors Corp., 567 S.W.2d 812, 818
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978)).
106. 584 S.W.2d at 847.
107. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
[Vol. 33:551
DESIGN DEFECTS
jury to consider the extent of the danger involved in the present
design and the possibility of adopting an alternative, safer design.
The instruction, of course, should state that the alternative design
should not jeopardize other safety aspects of the product, and must
be feasible from the standpoints of technology, cost, and usability.
The precise wording of the instruction is important and any list of
abstract factors of different types is likely to confuse the jury. At
the same time, an explanation of the need for considering whether
the design could feasibly be made safer is quite helpful.0 8
3. Burden of Proof and Judge-Jury Relations
The Barker case innovatively held that in a design case the
burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that the benefits of
the challenged design outweigh its inherent risk of danger.", This,
the court felt, was a significant way to differentiate a negligence
action from a strict liability action. This distinction is an artificial
one, however, and is not inherent in the concept of strict liability.
It is no more necessary to shift the burden of proof in a design case
than in a case of mismanufacture, since in neither situation is
there any need to show that defendant's conduct was negligent."0
Shifting the burden of proof has also been defended by the claim
that certain information and expertise is available to the defendant
but not to the plaintiff. Of course, discovery procedures reduce the
significance of this argument. By itself, then, shifting the burden of
proof (in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion) may not play an
extremely important role in products liability litigation.
The true significance of the Barker rule on the burden of proof
is its effect on determining when a design case goes to the jury.
Barker declares that the requirement for a "prima facie showing
[is] that the injury was proximately caused by the product's de-
sign.""' If this is enough to take the case to the jury, the role of the
judge will be substantially lessened and cases not going to the jury
will be few indeed. Trial judges direct a verdict far more frequently
on the basis of the inadequacy of the plaintiff's evidence than on
the strength of the defendant's case.
The Barker approach should be compared with Wilson v. Piper
108. In Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1979), Justice
Steakley offers a list of law review articles that have identified and compiled factors to be
taken into consideration in balancing the risks against the benefits of design.
109. This position has also been adopted in Alaska. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beall, 593 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1979).
110. The Barker case did not involve failure to warn, but could that court justify a
distinction between warning cases and other product liability actions?
111. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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Aircraft Corp."' Plaintiffs contended there that the aircraft would
not have been subject to stalling from carburetor icing if it had had
a fuel-injected engine instead of a carburetor system. The court
was offered no evidence on how that change would have affected
the plane's cost, economy of operation, maintenance requirements,
overall performance, or safety in respects other than susceptibility
to icing. Nor was there any explanation of why eighty to ninety
percent of small planes used a carburetor system. The court held,
therefore, that the design issue should not be submitted to the
jury, "unless the court is satisfied that there is evidence from
which the jury could find [that] the suggested alternatives are not
only technically feasible but also practicable in terms of cost and
the over-all design and operation of the product."'13 Traditionally,
the court controls the issues going to the jury by requiring that the
evidence must, at a minimum, be adequate to allow the jury, act-
ing reasonably, to find for the party having the burden of proof.
Wilson simply applies that position to a design defect case.
It is possible that the New Jersey and Pennsylvania cases"'
will be interpreted along similar lines. Perhaps the same can be
said even about California. There are two possible arguments to
this effect. First, Barker "did not alter the need for demonstrating
the availability of reasonable alternate design, but simply shifted
to defendant the burden of proving the unreasonableness of requir-
ing an alternative in terms of such items as cost of producing the
alternative product.""11 5 Second, showing that "the injury was prox-
imately caused by the product's design" means that "some feature
of the product other than its simple generic quality caused the in-
jury at a time that the product was being put to its intended or
reasonably foreseeable use.""'
Two additional thoughts may be worth brief mention here.
First, on the subject of the burden of proof, if courts should decide
to follow Barker and place the burden of proof on the defendant,
might they not reach a better reconciliation of that concept with
the principles of Wilson? Suppose the plaintiff were required to go
further than showing an injury caused by the particular aspect of
112. 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, rehearing denied, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978); see
text accompanying notes 40-43, supra.
113. Id. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1327.
114. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979);
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). See notes 44-60 supra.
115. Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84. Cal. App. 3d 868, 879 n.3, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843, 849
n.3, (1978).
116. Korli v. Ford Motor Co., PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 8340, at 17,716 (Cal. App.
1978).
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the design of the product and to show that a safer alternative is
technologically feasible. Then the burden of nonpersuasion might
be placed on the defendant to show that the alternative is not
"practicable in terms of cost and the over-all design and operation
of the product." Would this be a fairer allocation of the burden, or
would the complexities of switching the burden mar its usefulness?
A second point concerns the allocation of functions between
judge and jury. Would it be better to treat strict liability for prod-
ucts (especially for "design defects") like strict liability for ultra-
hazardous or abnormally dangerous activities and let the determi-
nation of whether the product was unreasonably unsafe be treated
as a matter of law to be handled by the judge? Would he be better
qualified to appreciate the complicated technological issues and to
balance conflicting policy issues? This has been strongly urged by
Professor David Fischer,' 7 but no case law presently supports it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the holding in Greenman v. Yuba Products Co."' and
the promulgation of section 402A of the Second Restatement, the
courts have worked out a fairly definite consensus on the handling
of products cases involving "mismanufacture"-a flaw that devel-
oped during the manufacturing process. Through the early and
mid-1970's, they had been working toward a similar consensus in
product design cases. As the decade drew to a close, however, sev-
eral courts undertook a careful reanalysis of the concept of strict
products liability as it applies to the design cases. This is all to the
good. Strict liability is a judicial product, manufactured by the
judges with the assistance of the Restatement and other law com-
mentators. It is properly the responsibility of the judges to study
and refine their product, to promote the unfolding of the central
idea underlying the concept of strict liability, and to see that the
adjustment of the conflicting interests of the several types of per-
sons affected is fair and responsible. Unlike lawyers, however,
judges should not become primarily advocates for a particular in-
terest or point of view. When tort law develops to a point that one
group of persons conceives it to be too favorable to another group,
however, the first group is likely to seek legislative "redress." The
resort to the legislature is most likely to take place (and is most
likely to succeed) when the first group has the insurance companies
117. Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32 OKLA. L.
Rv. 93 (1979).
118. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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supporting it. Combined lobbying can be quite effective. The dan-
ger is that the statutes that are born in the lobbying effort are quite
likely to be greatly overreactive and set aside important gains ac-
quired over a period of many years."1 9 Not only does the common
law of products liability need to be fair and evenhanded to all clas-
ses of persons, it also needs to be as nearly uniform as possible.
Products are marketed nationwide, and uniform treatment is high-
ly desirable. Much of the commercial law in this country has been
reduced to a uniform commercial code, adopted throughout the
United States. The Uniform Law Commissioners hav6 not under-
taken to prepare a uniform products liability act, but the United
States Department of Commerce has labored long and carefully to
prepare a Model Uniform Product Liability Act, ' which it recom-
mends for adoption by the states. It may be that some time in the
future this Act will attain widespread adoption. In the meantime,
its provisions may well prove very helpful to the state courts as
they proceed with their responsibility of molding and adapting the
common law of products liability.
In addition to the general development of products liability
law, during the last few years a number of important new develop-
ments have taken place in the law of strict liability for improper
design of a product. This Article has tried to explain and discuss
these developments, to evaluate them, to show their relationship to
the general state of the law, and to make suggestions on how far
they should affect its future development. At present, the question
of "design defects" and the determination of when a product is ac-
tionable because of the nature of its design appears to be the most
agitated and controversial question before the courts in the field of
products liability. I hope that this Article can be of some help to
the courts in seeking to develop the most suitable answer to this
question and that it may prove to be an incentive toward produc-
ing a consensus on the subject. '
119. There is a sad irony in this phenomenon. State A in one section of the country
renders a decision putting a substantially broader liability on manufacturers (or suppliers).
The insurance companies raise their rates throughout the country and when the manufactur-
ers in State B in another region complain, they get the explanation that it is caused by the
substantive law of tort liability. So they go to the legislature in righteous indignation with a
statute and convince the legislators that they must have the relief in order to survive. The
ready-prepared statute is passed. It has two effects-(1) it substantially lowers consumer
rights in State B, and (2) it does not affect insurance rates because they are usually not set
on a state-by-state basis and, even if they were, the manufacturer's products are distributed
throughout the country and the substantive law of his home state is not especially relevant.
120. Reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
121. There are many other law review discussions of this matter, and most of them are
quite valuable. I list some of those published during the latter part of the 1970s that have
been most helpful to me: WEINSTEIN, TwERSKl, PiEmHan & DoNAHEa, PRODUCTS L AILrrY AND
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While this is the most pressing problem before the courts,
there are two other "reforms" in the law of products liability that
require almost equally urgent attention. The first is to combine
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability into a single
cause of action for products liability. When the plaintiff sues on
more than one of these bases, issues and instructions become so
complex and complicated that even the judge and the attorneys
become confused-much less the poor jury. Several courts have
held that separate causes of action cannot be brought for breach
of warranty and strict liability. Negligence can also be joined in
the single cause by permitting-but not requiring-evidence of
negligent conduct. The Department of Commerce's Model Uniform
Product Liability Act provides for a single cause of action, and a
federal court in Michigan has construed that state's act to imply
the establishment of a single cause of action.1 1 2 A statute does
not appear to be necessary, however. A strong opinion by a state
supreme court might well start a bandwagon parade.
The second "reform" is to treat the effect of plaintiffs fault on
a consistent and uniform basis. The technicalities of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse and their ensuing com-
plications bedevil the trial of product cases and often induce unjust
results. Whenever plaintiff's fault contributes to his injury, the
fault should not bar his recovery but should diminish the amount
on a proportionate basis.1 21 More than two thirds of the states have
THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT (1978) (amalgamation of several articles by the authors);
Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32 OKLA L. REv. 93
(1979); Green, Strict Liability under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54
TEx. L. REv. 1185 (1976); Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product
Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. Rav. 773 (1979);
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Ad-
judication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973); Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liabil-
ity: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 109 (1976); Keeton, Product Liability and
the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the
Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv.
803 (1976); Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 96
U. CmN. L. REv. 101 (1977); Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability,
28 DRAKE L. RV. 317 (1979); Sachs, Negligence or Strict Products Liability: Is There Really
a Difference in Law or Economics?, 8 GA. J. INT. & Comp. L. 259 (1978); G. Schwartz, Fore-
word: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALF. L. REv. 435 (1979); V. Schwartz, Com-
ments to Model Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979); Vetri, Products
Liability: Developing a Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REv. 293 (1975); Walkowiak,
Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods: "Reasonableness" Revis-
ited?, 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 705 (1979). See also Annot., 96 A.L.R.3d 22 (1979).
122. Jorae v. Clinton Crop Serv., 465 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
123. Some "assumption of risk" is an actual, valid, and binding consent to the risk
and may bar recovery for that reason and not because the plaintiff was at fault. Some "mis-
use" is accurately a holding that the product was not really actionable, and plaintiff's fault,
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now adopted the principle of proportionate responsibility in one
form or another."2 ' Many have applied it to strict liability for prod-
ucts: some because comparative fault was judicially adopted, some
by construing their statutes to this effect, and some by adopting a
judicial principle of comparative causation, regardless of whether
the state has an applicable comparative fault statute or not.,2 5
The courts are fully capable of refining and perfecting the
common law of products liability. I believe they will do it.
whether present or not, is not relevant. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAUI:T Acr § 1, and
Comments.
124. For an exposition of its status, see Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Develop-
ment in the United States and Present Status in Louisiana, 40 Lk. L. REV. 299 (1980).
125. Two important recent cases, Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, Beloit Power Systems,
Inc., 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) and General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344
(Tex. 1977), are worthy of serious study in connection with the judicial application of com-
parative causation principles to products claims. See generally Fischer, Products Liability-
Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REv. 431 (1978); Fischer, Products
Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence to Misuse and Assumption of Risk, id.
at 644; Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10
IND. L. REV. 797 (1977); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Com-
parative Fault Act, 29 MERcER L. REV. 373 (1978).
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